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MAKING DEMOCRACY HARDER TO HACK Scott J. Shackelford, JD, PhD*, Bruce Schneier**, Michael Sulmeyer, JD, PhD***, Anne Boustead, JD, PhD****, Ben Buchanan, PhD*****, Amanda N. Craig Deckard, JD******, Trey Herr, PhD*******, Jessica Malekos Smith, JD******** Abstract 
 With the Russian government hack of the Democratic National 
Convention email servers and related leaks, the drama of the 2016 U.S. 
presidential race highlights an important point: nefarious hackers do not 
just pose a risk to vulnerable companies; cyber attacks can potentially 
impact the trajectory of democracies. Yet a consensus has been slow to 
emerge as to the desirability and feasibility of reclassifying elections—in 
particular, voting machines—as critical infrastructure, due in part to the 
long history of local and state control of voting procedures. This Article 
takes on the debate—focusing on policy options beyond former Department 
of Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson’s decision to classify elections as 
critical infrastructure in January 2017—in the U.S., using the 2016 elections 
as a case study, but putting the issue in a global context, with in-depth case 
studies from South Africa, Estonia, Brazil, Germany, and India. Governance 
best practices are analyzed by reviewing these differing approaches to 
securing elections, including the extent to which trend lines are converging 
or diverging. This investigation will, in turn, help inform ongoing minilateral 
efforts at cybersecurity norm building in the critical infrastructure context, 
which are considered here for the first time in the literature through the lens 
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INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the alleged Russian government hack of the Dem-
ocratic National Committee’s email servers, a debate is brewing
about how to mitigate the risk of hackers who are now not only
targeting individuals, firms, and governmental secrets, but are also
now going after the election machinery upon which U.S. demo-
cratic society is built.1 Indeed, cybersecurity, which was first
mentioned in the State of the Union address by President Obama
in 2013, has become so central to U.S. national security that the
topic was featured in the first Clinton-Trump presidential debate of
2016.2 Beyond political parties, vulnerabilities are replete across the
myriad locally managed systems that together comprise the U.S.
1. See David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, As Democrats Gather, a Russian Subplot Raises
Intrigue, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/25/us/politics/don-
ald-trump-russia-emails.html?smprod=nytcore-iphone&smid=nytcore-iphone-share&_r=1.
2. See Shanika Gunaratna, Cybersecurity Expert: One Battleground State Most Vulnerable to
Voting Hacks, CBS NEWS (Sept. 29, 2016, 1:38 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ex-nsa-
expert-if-i-were-an-election-day-hacker-id-hit-pennsylvania/?google_editors_picks=true.
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election infrastructure, including voting machines that in some
cases—such as in the case of many Pennsylvania counties—have
“zero paper trails” and are often running “severely outdated operat-
ing systems like Windows XP, which has not been patched . . . since
2014.”3 This raises the question of whether voting machines should
be treated as “critical infrastructure”; i.e., one of the sectors of the
U.S. economy that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
has prioritized for their importance, ranging from finance to
healthcare.4 The distinction matters, because when something is
designated as “critical,” regulation is more likely to follow. Answer-
ing that question is far from straightforward, with the long history
of local and state control over elections butting up against twenty-
first-century global security challenges. Still, it is a matter that de-
serves scholarly analysis, and is the overriding concept with which
this Article is concerned.5
Until January 2017 with Department of Homeland Security Sec-
retary Jeh Johnson’s decision to classify elections as critical
infrastructure,6 U.S. election infrastructure had not received the
same level of scrutiny as other critical infrastructure sectors such as
3. Id.; Bruce Schneier, By November, Russian Hackers Could Target Voting Machines, WASH.
POST (July 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/07/27/by-
november-russian-hackers-could-target-voting-machines/?utm_term=.7711a7f60b27; see also
Eric Geller & Tim Starks, Paperless Voting Could Fuel ‘Rigged’ Election Claims, POLITICO (Sept. 7,
2016, 5:05 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/paperless-voting-could-fuel-rigged-
election-claims-227806 (arguing that four competitive states use voting machines that leave
no paper ballots could lead to distrust in the vote tallying).
4. What is Critical Infrastructure?, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/
what-critical-infrastructure (last visited Jan. 21, 2017); What is the ICS-CERT Mission?, U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/Frequently-Asked-Questions (last visited
Jan. 21, 2017) (explaining that the U.S. Cyber Emergency Response Team, which is part of
DHS, identifies sixteen critical infrastructure sectors consistent with Homeland Security Pres-
idential Directive 7, including: agriculture, banking and finance, chemical, commercial
facilities, dams, defense industrial base, drinking water and water treatment systems, emer-
gency systems, energy, government facilities, information technology, nuclear systems, public
health and healthcare, telecommunications, and transportation systems).
5. See Cybersecurity: Ensuring the Integrity of the Ballot Box: Hearing before the H. Subcomm. on
Information Technology, 114th Cong. 1 (2016), https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/up
loads/2016/09/2016-09-28-Appel-Princeton-Testimony.pdf (written testimony of Andrew W.
Appel, Professor, Princeton University) (“I strongly recommend that, at a minimum, the
Congress seek to ensure the elimination of ‘touchscreen’ voting machines, immediately after
this November’s election; and that it require that all elections be subject to sensible auditing
after every election to ensure that systems are functioning properly and to prove to the Amer-
ican people that their votes are counted as cast.”) [hereinafter Appel Testimony]; ELECTION
VERIFICATION, TEN THINGS ELECTION OFFICIALS CAN DO TO HELP SECURE AND INSPIRE CONFI-
DENCE IN THIS FALL’S ELECTIONS (2016), https://electionverification.org/wp-content/up
loads/2016/09/evntop109516.pdf.
6. See, e.g., Katie Bo Williams, DHS Designates Election Systems as ‘Critical Infrastructure,’
THE HILL (Jan. 6, 2017, 6:10 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/313132-dhs-
designates-election-systems-as-critical-infrastructure.
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power lines and wastewater plants. This lack of scrutiny has oc-
curred despite a long international history of attacks on voting
machines and databases going back as far as 1994 (when Nelson
Mandela’s victory in South Africa’s first democratic election was ini-
tially diluted because of fraud, as is discussed further in Part II).7
The United States electoral process may also be vulnerable to cyber-
security threats. During a 2012 pilot program to test online voting
in Washington, D.C., researchers from the University of Michigan
hacked the government website and were able to replace votes at
will, as well as configure the system so that the University’s fight
song would play after a vote was cast.8 More recently, evidence has
emerged that hackers have probed the voter registration systems in
more than twenty U.S. states.9 Voting is arguably as important to
our long-term prosperity as functioning telecom networks and fi-
nancial systems. DHS has now taken this first step of explicitly
including election infrastructure and affiliated networks as demo-
cratic critical infrastructure under the “government facilities”
subsector,10 some of the benefits and drawbacks of which are ex-
plored in Part I. This move could now pave the way for the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), in collaboration
with industry, to craft cybersecurity best practices to help jurisdic-
tions across the nation navigate the often-confusing choices among
voting technology providers.11 In fact, the choice is so muddled that
some cities—including Los Angeles—have developed their own sys-
tems that incorporate various combinations of touch screens and
paper ballots.12
Securing election infrastructure is not just a problem for the
United States. Both developing nations and advanced democracies
around the world are grappling with the best ways to manage cyber
7. See Eric Geller, Online Voting is a Cybersecurity Nightmare, DAILY DOT (June 10, 2016,
2:33 PM), http://www.dailydot.com/layer8/online-voting-cybersecurity-election-fraud-hack
ing/.
8. See Timothy B. Lee, The Michigan Fight Song and Four Other Reasons to Avoid Internet
Voting, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 24, 2012, 11:30 PM), https://web.archive.org/web/201605
30213438/http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/10/the-michigan-fight-song-and-four-
other-reasons-to-avoid-internet-voting/.
9. See Eric Geller & Darren Samuelsohn, More Than 20 States Have Faced Major Election
Hacking Attempts, DHS Says, POLITICO (Sept. 30, 2016, 4:33 PM), http://www.politico.com/
story/2016/09/states-major-election-hacking-228978.
10. Critical Infrastructure Sectors, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/crit
ical-infrastructure-sectors (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
11. See NIST and the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH.,
https://www.nist.gov/itl/voting (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
12. Doug Chapin, Los Angeles County Unveils New Voting System Prototype, ELECTION ACAD.
(July 5, 2016), http://editions.lib.umn.edu/electionacademy/2016/07/05/los-angeles-coun
ty-unveils-new-voting-system-prototype/.
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risk and build trust in diverse voting systems. These efforts range
from Estonia—where up to twenty-five percent of votes were cast
online in the last parliamentary elections13—to Mexico, where
more than ninety million voter records have been breached, with
allegations that “one of the main political parties . . . may have
played a part in its release.”14 At the global level, international
cybersecurity norm building in the critical infrastructure context is
also proceeding, with new pronouncements from the G2, G7, G20,
and the United Nations that are unpacked in Part III as part of a
polycentric path forward for enhancing the security of elections
worldwide.15 Thus, the decisions made by U.S. policymakers about
the best path forward to enhance election security have the poten-
tial to reverberate in democracies the world over. Even though
widespread hacking was not discovered on election day 2016, voting
glitches were reported in Texas, Pennsylvania, and Utah,16 and the
mistrust bred by questions of voting security continues to
reverberate.
This Article is structured as follows. Part I defines critical infra-
structure, identifies possible vulnerabilities in the electoral process,
and examines the case for including elections under this designa-
tion. Part II undertakes a comparative analysis of national case
studies, including South Africa, Estonia, Brazil, Germany, and In-
dia, in an effort to identify governance best practices to better
inform the U.S. debate. Finally, Part III delves into the global di-
mension by analyzing the potential for international cybersecurity
norm building from existing minilateral and multilateral forums
through the lens of polycentric governance. It concludes by investi-
gating implications for policymakers in the U.S. and abroad.
I. DEFINING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE VOTING CONTEXT
What constitutes critical infrastructure (CI) is often in the eye of
the beholder. For example, the United States recognizes sixteen CI
13. See Independent Report on E-Voting in Estonia, https://estoniaevoting.org/ (last visited
Jan. 21, 2017).
14. Jason Murdock, Mexico Election Hack: Political Party Behind Leak of 93.4 Million Voter
Records?, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/mexico-election-hack-
political-party-behind-leak-93-4-million-voter-records-1556608.
15. See infra Part III.A.
16. See, e.g., Tess Owen, Utah Vote Glitch, VICE NEWS (Nov. 8, 2016), https://news.vice.
com/story/voting-machines-are-broken-at-every-polling-place-in-one-utah-county.
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sectors, while the European Union recognizes only eight.17 Even
within the United States, it cannot actually be said that the federal
government has a single definition of what constitutes CI in all
cases, to say nothing of how it should be secured.18 This Part in-
troduces the existing critical infrastructure sectors before moving
on to analyze vulnerabilities in the election process and review the
arguments for classifying it as CI. This sets the stage for the compar-
ative analysis in Part II and next steps contemplated in Part III.
A. Managing Risk to Critical Infrastructure
The term “critical infrastructure” can elicit images of sudden and
dramatic threats to national security. Contaminated water sanita-
tion systems may injure thousands before any issue is detected;
vulnerable electrical grids may black out cities; and disrupted finan-
cial systems may destabilize economies.19 Advanced malware
(malicious software) can even cause nuclear enrichment cen-
trifuges to spin out of control, risking collateral damage.20 Many
17. See Critical Infrastructure Sectors, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/
critical-infrastructure-sectors (last visited Jan. 21, 2017); Council Directive 2008/114/EC, An-
nex I, 2008 O.J. (L345) 75, 81 (EC), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008L0114&from=EN; JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIA-
MENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE
OF THE REGIONS: CYBERSECURITY STRATEGY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: AN OPEN, SAFE AND SE-
CURE CYBERSPACE 4–5, 17–19 (2013) [hereinafter EU CYBERSECURITY STRATEGY] (the proposal
includes five strategic priorities: (1) to “achiev[e] cyber resilience”; (2) to “[d]rastically
reduc[e] cybercrime; (3) to “develop[ ] [a new] cyberdefense policy”; (4) to “[d]evelop the
industrial and technological resources for cybersecurity”; and (5) to “[e]stablish a coherent
international cyberspace policy for the European Union and promote core EU values”).
18. See Cybersecurity Update: Key US and EU Regulatory Developments, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE,
MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (June 25, 2013), https://www.skadden.com/insights/cybersecurity-
update; see also JO¨RN BRO¨MMELHO¨RSTER, SANDRA FABRY & NICO WIRTZ, CRITICAL INFRASTRUC-
TURE PROTECTION: SURVEY OF WORLDWIDE ACTIVITIES 3 (2002) (noting the lack of an “all
embracing” U.S. CI strategy, but noting significant progress in securing CI).
19. See RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT THREAT TO NA-
TIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 70, 234 (2010).  The 2007 blockbuster Die Hard
4.0 dramatized the prospect of a large-scale cyber assault: in it, a frustrated former Pentagon
insider and a team of hackers interrupted U.S. air traffic control, power, telecommunica-
tions, and financial services.  According to Richard Clarke, such a scenario is feasible under
certain circumstances.  Michiko Takutani, The Attack Coming from Bytes, Not Bombs, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 26, 2010, at C1.
20. See Steven Cherry, How Stuxnet is Rewriting the Cyberterrorism Playbook, IEEE SPECTRUM
(Oct. 13, 2010), http://spectrum.ieee.org/podcast/telecom/security/how-stuxnet-is-rewrit-
ing-the-cyberterrorism-playbook; Grant Gross, Experts: Stuxnet Changed the Cybersecurity
Landscape, PC WORLD (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.pcworld.com/article/210971/article.
html; Stuxnet: Computer Worm Opens New Era of Warfare, CBS NEWS: 60 MINUTES (Mar. 4, 2012,
11:00 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/stuxnet-computer-worm-opens-new-era-of-war-
fare/?lumiereId=50120975&videoId=67716b02-8bdf-11e2-9400-029118418759&cbsId=74009
04&site=cbsnews.
SPRING 2017] Making Democracy Harder to Hack 635
countries are issuing new laws and policies to secure their critical
infrastructure, even as they struggle to define what should be con-
sidered critical.21 As we will see, this line is difficult to draw,
particularly in the voting context.
The threat to CI is not new. Ancient Rome struggled to protect
its aqueducts from invading Germanic tribes,22 and the Ottoman
Empire went to great lengths to protect its extensive road net-
work.23 More recently, governments have focused on protecting a
wider range of modern facilities and public services, including
those that not only supply us with water and transportation but also
energy, emergency services, communication, and access to financial
resources.24 Many of these facilities and services now rely on infor-
mation technology (IT) networks.25 The U.S. government, for
example, defines a wide variety of national industries as part of CI,
including the defense industrial base, emergency services, health-
care, and information technology.26 While government facilities are
considered part of U.S. CI, this sector is primarily concerned with
the physical buildings that are occupied by federal, state, and local
government, as well as the people and systems that keep these
buildings safe and operational.27 Election systems are not explicitly
considered part of the U.S. CI. But should they be? What role
21. For more on this topic, see Scott J. Shackelford et al., Toward a Global Standard of
Cybersecurity Care?: Exploring the Implications of the 2014 Cybersecurity Framework on Shaping Rea-
sonable National and International Cybersecurity Practices, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 305 (2015).
22. Michael J. Assante, Infrastructure Protection in the Ancient World, PROC. OF THE 42ND
HAW. INT’L CONF. ON SYS. SCI. 1–2 (2009), http://www.academia.edu/16549136/Infrastruc
ture_Protection_in_the_Ancient_World.
23. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 119 (Ga´bor A´goston & Bruce A. Masters
eds., 2009).
24. See U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., NIPP 2013: PARTNERING FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUC-
TURE SECURITY AND RESILIENCE 9 (2013) https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publica
tions/National-Infrastructure-Protection-Plan-2013-508.pdf.
25. See, e.g., PAUL CORNISH ET AL., CYBER SECURITY AND THE UK’S CRITICAL NATIONAL
INFRASTRUCTURE 1–4 (2011), http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Re
search/International%20Security/r0911cyber.pdf.
26. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Presidential Policy Directive 21 (Feb. 12,
2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-direc
tive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil.
27. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PLAN:
GOVERNMENT FACILITIES SECTOR, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp_governmt.pdf
(last visited Jan. 31, 2017) (describing the government facilities sector as comprising govern-
ment buildings, “cyber elements that contribute to the protection of sector assets (e.g., access
control systems and closed-circuit television systems) as well as the protection of individuals
who possess tactical, operational, or strategic knowledge or perform essential functions”).
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should government play in protecting these vital resources, particu-
larly as applied to securing democratic elections?28 The next section
introduces vulnerabilities to the electoral process before moving on
to analyze the benefits and drawbacks of classifying these machines
as CI.
B. Identifying Vulnerabilities in the Electoral Process
At least five areas of the electoral process are potentially vulnera-
ble to hacking. These are: (1) the information received by voters in
the lead-up to the election; (2) the rolls used to check voters in on
Election Day; (3) the machines on which voters cast their ballots;
(4) the tabulation mechanisms for determining the winners; and
(5) the dissemination systems used to spread news of the results.29
Each of these areas is discussed in turn. While a full discussion of all
possible weaknesses in these areas is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle, this section highlights examples to illustrate the range of
potential threats in an effort to inform the CI decision.
First, we address the shaping of the information received by vot-
ers prior to an election. As was mentioned in the Introduction,
foreign electoral interference is nothing new: one study found that,
from 1946 to 2000, the United States and Russia together tried to
influence foreign elections 117 times, using overt and covert meth-
ods.30 But events in the summer of 2016 showed that the old tactic
could be adapted to the digital age. A hacker or group of hackers,
under the pseudonym “Guccifer 2.0,” posted documents obtained
through network intrusions into a variety of Democratic party enti-
ties in an effort to influence the election.31 While these operations
attracted enormous media attention, they do not fall within the
scope of this Article.
A second area of potential vulnerability regards the poll books
and systems used to verify voters’ eligibility and process registra-
tions. In some states, these systems are primarily or entirely
28. CORNISH, supra note 25, at viii (arguing that “government cannot provide all the
answers and cannot guarantee national cyber security in all respects and for all
stakeholders”).
29. See also Andrew Appel, Security Against Election Hacking, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Aug. 17,
2016), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2016/08/17/security-against-election-hacking-part-1-
software-independence/ (discussing three vulnerabilities to elections: the registration pro-
cess, voting machines, and post-election tabulation).
30. See Don H. Levin, When the Great Power Gets a Vote: The Effects of Great Power Electoral
Interventions on Election Results, 60 INT’L STUD. Q. 189, 189 (2016).
31. See Robert Hackett, Clinton Foundation Denies Hacking Claims, FORTUNE (Oct. 4, 2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/10/04/clinton-foundation-guccifer-hack-claim/.
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electronic.32 A hacker might try to delete a limited number of en-
tries from the poll book just prior to the election, making it difficult
for voters to check in on Election Day, contributing to delay and
undermining trust.33 It has been reported that the voting rolls or
registration systems in more than twenty states have been targeted
by hackers in 2016 alone.34
A third area of vulnerability refers to the voting machines them-
selves. Once voters have checked in, they often cast their votes on
voting machines. There are two principal types of voting machines
in the United States: those that generate a paper trail of some kind,
and those that do not. Machines in the former category either in-
struct the voter to mark a paper ballot that the machines optically
scan, or take the voter’s input and mark a paper ballot that is
presented to the voter for verification. Machines in the latter cate-
gory instruct voters to mark a digital ballot, usually on a
touchscreen; the machines then aggregate all the digital ballots to
produce a result.35 Security audits of voting machines have revealed
a wide range and large number of weaknesses. Some machines have
wireless Internet connectivity with weak encryption and insecure
(or even non-existent) passwords. Others are vulnerable to physical
tampering that would permit attackers to install malicious code,
perhaps through thumb drives. Still others run out-of-date operat-
ing systems with unpatched critical vulnerabilities that hackers
could exploit, such as the voting machines running Windows XP
mentioned in the Introduction.36 Across the many jurisdictions that
hold elections, there is no uniformly applied standard or machine.
32. Katy Owens Hubler, Electronic Poll Books, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May
21, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/electronic-
pollbooks.aspx; see, e.g., Karen Farkas, Electronic Poll Books Will Be at Voting Locations Across the
State by November 2016, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER (Aug. 28, 2015, 7:03 AM), http://www.cleve-
land.com/metro/index.ssf/2015/08/electronic_poll_books_will_be.html.
33. Protecting the 2016 Elections from Cyber and Voting Machine Attacks: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Space, Science, & Tech., 114th Cong. (2016) (statement of Dr. Dan S. Wallach, Pro-
fessor, Rice University), https://science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/
files/documents/HHRG-114-SY-WState-DWallach-20160913.pdf.
34. See Tami Abdollah, US Official: Hackers Targeted Election Systems of 20 States, ASSOC.
PRESS (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.apnews.com/c6f67fb36d844f28bd18a522811bdd18/US-
official:-Hackers-targeted-election-systems-of-20-states; see also Dave Bangert, Opinion, An Ex-
periment in Voter Fraud, JCONLINE (Oct. 10, 2016, 7:32 PM), http://www.jconline.com/story/
opinion/columnists/dave-bangert/2016/10/10/bangert-experiment-voter-fraud/91837292/
(demonstrating the steps required to fraudulently update voter registration).
35. For more on this topic, see Voting Equipment in the United States, VERIFIED VOTING
FOUNDATION, https://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/voting-equipment/ (last visited Jan.
21, 2017).
36. See Schneier, supra note 3.
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Nonetheless, security researchers have independently demon-
strated a range of possible attacks on various machines.37
Fourth, the tabulation systems that aggregate the results of an
election are also vulnerable. At the precinct level, some of the at-
tacks that target voting machines can also manipulate tabulation.
More centrally, attackers might be able to affect tabulation between
precincts. A hack of the Ukrainian voting system in 2014 removed
important files from the tabulation infrastructure just prior to the
election, requiring officials to rely on backups.38
Fifth, the Ukraine hack also hints at the final area of vulnerability
to election hacking: the dissemination of results to the media, and
ultimately to citizens. Less than an hour before results were due to
be reported in the Ukrainian election referenced above, it was dis-
covered that hackers had managed to break into the systems that
reported the results to news networks. A Ukrainian official later
said, “Offenders were trying by means of previously installed
software to fake election results in the given region and in such a
way to discredit general results of elections of the President of
Ukraine.”39 The authorities were able to counteract the hackers’ ef-
forts, leaving pro-Russian TV stations alone in reporting the fake
hacked results. This type of hack has the potential to create elec-
tion-day chaos that, depending on the time zone involved, could
impact voting behavior in a way similar to what occurred in the
2000 election.40
In summary, there are an array of attack vectors that impact elec-
tion security. And regardless of the success of hackers making use
of these vulnerabilities, if the knowledge of the attempts comes to
light, trust in the results may be undermined. Simply put, the at-
tacker might not care who wins; the losing side’s belief that the
election was stolen from them may be equally, if not more, valuable.
37. See, e.g., VIRGINIA INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AGENCY, SECURITY ASSESSMENT OF
WINVOTE VOTING EQUIPMENT FOR DEPARTMENT OF ELECTIONS (2015), https://www.wired.
com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/WINVote-final.pdf; SRINIVAS INGUVA ET AL., SOURCE
CODE REVIEW OF THE HART INTERCIVIC VOTING SYSTEM (2007), http://votingsystems.cdn.sos.
ca.gov/oversight/ttbr/Hart-source-public.pdf (report commissioned as part of the California
Secretary of State’s “Top-to-Bottom” Review of California Voting Systems).
38. Mark Clayton, Ukraine Election Narrowly Avoided ‘Wanton Destruction’ from Hackers,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, (June 17, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/
2014/0617/Ukraine-election-narrowly-avoided-wanton-destruction-from-hackers-video.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., John R. Lott, Jr., The Impact of Early Media Election Calls on Republican Voting
Rates in Florida’s Western Panhandle Counties in 2000, 123 PUB. CHOICE 349, 350 (2005).
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C. Arguments For and Against Classifying Elections
as Critical Infrastructure
During testimony before the House Homeland Security Commit-
tee, Francis Taylor, the Department of Homeland Security’s Under
Secretary of Intelligence and Analysis, said that cyber threats to
state election offices were “a continuing concern” for DHS Secre-
tary Jeh Johnson.41 Under Secretary Taylor elaborated,
There is concern about reports of hacking into the electoral
systems, voter systems and those sorts of things in a couple of
states so far. . . . We don’t believe the results of the election are
in jeopardy, but this is an area that we have to make sure that
our [local election] jurisdictions across this country . . . have
all the tools that they need to make sure those systems remain
secure.42
Unsaid in this comment was whether or not, given the vulnerabili-
ties in election security discussed above, DHS should reclassify
voting machines and potentially other elements of the election pro-
cess as CI. That question was answered on January 6, 2017, when—
as was noted above—Secretary Johnson made the affirmative choice
to undertake this classification.43
To date, most suggestions of treating elections as CI focus on the
vote and tabulation machines, arguing that their importance in
elections demands protection from outside interference or manipu-
lation.44 But this presents a limited perspective on elections and the
democratic process, where the inputs to this voting system matter as
much as, or potentially even more than, the integrity of the ballot
machinery itself. Why should the election machinery receive height-
ened focus or protection over other parts of the democratic
41. Eric Geller, Hackers Hit State Democratic Parties, POLITICO (Sept. 15, 2016, 10:00 AM),
http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/morning-cybersecurity/2016/09/hackers-hit-state-demo-
cratic-parties-senior-officials-urge-calm-on-encryption-remember-the-power-grid-216338.
42. Id.
43. See Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement by Secretary Jeh Johnson on
the Designation of Election Infrastructure as a Critical Infrastructure Subsector (Jan. 6,
2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/01/06/statement-secretary-johnson-designation-
election-infrastructure-critical (“By ‘election infrastructure,’ we mean storage facilities, pol-
ling places, and centralized vote tabulations locations used to support the election process,
and information and communications technology to include voter registration databases, vot-
ing machines, and other systems to manage the election process and report and display
results on behalf of state and local governments.”).
44. Kate O’Keefe & Byron Tau, U.S. Considers Classifying Election System as ‘Critical Infra-
structure,’ WALL STREET J. (Aug. 3, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-considers-classify
ing-election-system-as-critical-infrastructure-1470264895.
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process? Among the challenges in classifying areas of economic or
social activity as CI are the intensely political nature of the process
and the absence of real resource constraints. Adding or reclassify-
ing a sector deemed critical by DHS is largely a political process and
so is not limited by scarce dollars, time, or talent (other than that of
the legislature). This means that while risk management may play
an important role in securing each of the individual sectors, it does
not apply well to their selection.
One benefit of reclassifying voting machines as CI is that this will
grant DHS a larger role in securing outdated machines. Standards
bodies such as NIST can now more effectively target their resources
toward creating governance frameworks to help promote election
integrity. Further, best practices may be shared from existing Infor-
mation Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) organized around
other CI sectors. There is the possibility of creating a voting ISAC,
or Information Sharing and Analysis Organization (ISAO), to help
more effectively share cyber threat information and best practices
(discussed further in Part III(C)). And local, state, and federal
policymakers might be more willing to allocate resources to secur-
ing existing machines, or buying new ones, with a CI designation.
However, there are also substantial costs to such a reclassifica-
tion, which may now be realized. Some of these costs are political:
some states (including Georgia) have already come out against fed-
eral involvement in state election procedures, which could exert
pressure on the new Trump administration to revisit the issue.45
There are perceived federalism concerns, discussed further in Part
III(C), centered on the perception of federal oversight of state elec-
tions as well as the implications to national and international
security. For example, if voting machines are CI and foreign powers
tamper with them, the U.S. government would have to make clear
what steps it would be willing to take to respond. Timing is also
important. It may be a mistake, for example, to designate election
infrastructure as CI close to an election. However, it should be
noted that designating elections as CI is the beginning and not the
end of the conversation, given the limited change that would bring
to the unsustainable status quo, as is discussed further in Part III.
Weighing these benefits and drawbacks is no easy task. To help pro-
vide context to inform the discussion, Part II summarizes the
45. See Eleanor Lamb, Secretaries of State Fume Over Election Critical Infrastructure Designa-
tion, 21ST CENTURY (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.21centurystate.com/articles/secretaries-of-
state-fume-over-election-critical-infrastructure-designation/; Eric Geller, Elections Security: Fed-
eral Help or Power Grab?, POLITICO (Aug. 28, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/
election-cyber-security-georgia-227475.
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experience of various nations and how they have—with varying de-
grees of success—secured their own election infrastructure.
II. COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO ENHANCING VOTING SECURITY
This Part features in-depth case studies from the United States,
South Africa, Estonia, Brazil, Germany, and India, focusing on how
threats to these nations’ voting practices have been made manifest
and what they have done to mitigate the risk. After the case studies,
a brief summary compares these national approaches to inform the
norm building discussion in Part III.
A. United States
In the United States, state governments have long exerted signifi-
cant control over election processes and infrastructure. Under the
U.S. Constitution, state legislatures are responsible for regulating
the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators
and Representatives,” although Congress may “make or alter such
Regulations.”46 Because states play a primary role in the administra-
tion of elections, election processes can be adapted to the special
needs and circumstances of each state. However, state control over
election processes has also led to significant variation in how states
register voters and administer elections, and resulted in significant
variation in the challenges to securing these processes.47
For example, while voters in both New Jersey and Nevada use
Direct-Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines, the voting ma-
chines used in New Jersey do not generate a paper trail.48 The
voting machines used in Nevada, by contrast, do produce a paper
record, which the user must approve before casting their vote.49
Without a paper trail, it is impossible to verify the votes cast inde-
pendently of the machinery used to cast them. This may make it
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
47. For a description of variation in state adoption of voting technology, see Verified
Voting, VERIFIED VOTING FOUND., https://www.verifiedvoting.org/verifier/ (last visited Jan.
21, 2017).  It should be noted that the variation in voting technology across states may also
serve a protective function.  Voting processes may be a less appealing target, as an attacker
can only breach a limited number of election systems at a time.
48. Id.
49. Id.  The Clark County Election Department offers a detailed description of how to
vote in Nevada, including how voters view and confirm the paper audit trail. See Election
Department: Voting Machines and Instructions, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA, http://www.clarkcounty
nv.gov/election/Pages/VoteMachs.aspx (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
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impossible to audit the voting machines to confirm that the results
are congruent with a count of paper records,50 or produce an accu-
rate vote count in the event that the electronic voting machines
have been compromised.51 A significant number of states—includ-
ing Michigan, New York, and New Mexico—use paper ballots,
which are completed by hand and then optically scanned into a
voting machine.52 Security experts have identified optical-scan pa-
per ballots as less vulnerable to computer hacking because the
paper ballot is “the ballot of record, and it can be recounted by
hand, in a way we can trust,”53 which is particularly helpful when
auditing such records is required under state law.
While the administration of elections is an inherently local activ-
ity, there have been federal efforts to ensure the security and
reliability of elections. After the extensive difficulties caused by use
of punch-card ballots in Florida during the 2000 presidential elec-
tion,54 Congress passed the Help America Vote Act of 2002
(HAVA),55 which required states to adopt voting systems that allow
the voter to verify which candidate they have selected and correct
an erroneous selection, as well as create an auditable record.56
HAVA also provided funding for the purchase of new voting ma-
chines, leading some states to update their election infrastructure
by adopting electronic voting machines.57 At the time, little atten-
tion was paid to potential security risks, and some electronic voting
machines had significant vulnerabilities.58 In particular, the
WinVote machines used by Virginia could have allowed “‘anyone
within a half mile . . . [to] modif[y] every vote, undetected’ without
‘any technical expertise.’”59 To date, however, there is no evidence
that any voting machines have been hacked during a U.S.
election.60
While voting machines have not yet been the subject of malicious
activity, several state election systems have recently come under at-
tack. Voter registration databases in Arizona and Illinois were
50. See Appel Testimony, supra note 5.
51. Id.
52. See Verified Voting, supra note 47.
53. Appel Testimony, supra note 5.
54. Bush v. Gore, 531. U.S. 98 (2000).
55. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 15482).
56. Id. at § 301.
57. Brian Barrett, America’s Electronic Voting Machines are Scarily Easy Targets, WIRED (Aug.
2, 2016, 9:57 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/08/americas-voting-machines-arent-ready-
election/.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See id.
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accessed by Russian actors,61 although these attacks cannot yet be
definitively attributed to the Russian government.62 While over
200,000 voter registration records were exposed in these breaches,
there are no indications that the information in these records was
altered.63 However, there are still concerns that these attacks under-
mine public trust in the election process, as it is impossible to
“patch this psychological vulnerability.”64
The U.S. federal government became increasingly concerned
about the security of the 2016 election, particularly as there was
evidence that the Russian government attempted to influence the
election. Consequently, there were several federal agencies attempt-
ing to assist state governments in securing their electoral process.
The Electoral Assistance Commission (EAC), established by HAVA,
has a long-established program that “certifies, decertifies and recer-
tifies voting system hardware and software and accredits test
laboratories.”65 While this program is voluntary under federal law,
as of 2009, thirty states had passed legislation requiring federal cer-
tification of voting machines, testing of voting machines to federal
standards, or testing of voting machines by a federally accredited
laboratory.66
After the breach of voter registration systems in Illinois and Ari-
zona, the DHS offered assistance to state and local election
officials.67 This assistance is “strictly voluntary and does not entail
regulation, binding directives, and is not offered to supersede state
and local control over the process.”68 DHS has offered to perform
61. See Elias Groll, Did Russia Really Hack U.S. Election Systems?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 30,
2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/30/did-russia-really-hack-u-s-election-systems/.
62. See Press Release, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Joint Statement from the
Department of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of National Security (Oct. 7,
2016), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/215-press-releases-2016/
1423-joint-dhs-odni-election-security-statement.
63. Douglas Ernst, Election Systems Hacked in Illinois, Arizona: ‘The FBI is Very Much Worried’,
WASH. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/aug/29/elec-
tion-systems-hacked-in-illinois-arizona-the-fb/.
64. Andy Greenberg, Hack Brief: As FBI Warns Election Sites Got Hacked, All Eyes are on
Russia, WIRED (Aug. 29, 2016, 11:49 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/08/hack-brief-fbi-
warns-election-sites-got-hacked-eyes-russia/.
65. Testing and Certification Program, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, https://www.
eac.gov/testing_and_certification/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
66. State Requirements and the Federal Voting System Testing and Certification Program, U.S.
ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Page/State%20Requirements
%20and%20the%20Federal%20Voting%20System%20Testing%20and%20Certification%20
Program.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
67. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement by Secretary Johnson Con-
cerning the Cybersecurity of the Nation’s Election Systems (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.
dhs.gov/news/2016/09/16/statement-secretary-johnson-concerning-cybersecurity-nation%
E2%80%99s-election-systems.
68. Id.
644 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 50:3
scans on Internet-connected equipment to identify vulnerabilities,
complete in-depth vulnerability assessments of election-related sys-
tems, assist in responding to cybersecurity threats and attacks
through the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integra-
tion Center, and facilitate the sharing of information regarding
potential threats to election systems between different states.69
However, federal attempts to promote a secure election process
have been met with significant bipartisan resistance from state offi-
cials, as mentioned above. State policymakers are particularly
concerned that federal efforts to secure the election process may
invite further federal involvement in election activities that have tra-
ditionally been regulated on the state level. Vermont Secretary of
State Jim Condos described DHS efforts to test and secure state
election infrastructure as a “nose under the tent” that could create
precedent for expanded federal control of election processes;
Georgia Secretary of State Brian Kemp expressed concern as to
“whether the federal government will subvert the Constitution to
achieve the goal of federalizing elections under the guise of secur-
ity.”70 Similarly, the Ohio Secretary of State, Jon Husted, requested
that Congress block DHS from designating state election systems as
CI, an effort that was ultimately unsuccessful.71 Speaker Paul Ryan
and Majority Leader Mitch McConnell have also gone on record as
opposing the CI classification.72 Yet other political leaders—includ-
ing Senators Tom Carper and John McCain—have expressed their
support for enhanced federal protection of the decentralized U.S.
election system.73 This controversy, though, seemed to have little
impact on the uptake of federal tools designed to protect the elec-
tion process, with all fifty states accepting DHS assistance in
69. Id.
70. Geller, supra note 45.
71. See Letter from Jon Husted, Sec’y of State, Ohio, to Mitch McConnell, Sen., U.S., &
Paul Ryan, Rep., U.S. (Sept. 29, 2016), http://files.constantcontact.com/b01249ec501/ca0fc
e53-25b4-41cd-b0f3-a8cafec27171.pdf.
72. Letter from Paul Ryan, Rep., U.S., Nancy Pelosi, Rep., U.S., Mitch McConnell, Sen.,
U.S. & Harry Reid, Sen., U.S. to Todd Valentine, President, Nat’l Ass’n of State Electoral
Dirs. (Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000157-7606-d0b2-a35f-7e1f2aac00
01.
73. See, e.g., Press Release, Senator John McCain, Senator John McCain Urges FBI to
Address Cyberattacks on Arizona Election System (Sept. 14, 2016), http://www.mc-
cain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=D66D63D5-23FE-4545-9E01-E8F7989F
30BE; David Jones, Feds Warn States to Batten Down Hatches Following Election System Attacks,
TECH. NEWS WORLD (Sept. 2, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://www.technewsworld.com/story/83866.
html?google_editors_picks=true (“The attacks, dating back to June, led to the illegal
download of information on more than 200,000 Illinois voters, leading to a 10-day shutdown
of the state’s voter registration system.  Hackers also penetrated systems in Arizona but appar-
ently failed to download specific voter information.”).
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identifying and repairing weaknesses in their election infrastructure
by early November 2016.74 It is unclear whether reclassifying elec-
tion systems as part of CI may over the medium term exacerbate or
alleviate such state resistance, but it has has the benefit of focusing
attention and resources on this vexing issue.
B. South Africa
South African election procedures are a product of the country’s
transition out of apartheid in the early 1990s.75 As the enfranchise-
ment of black South Africans was a critical part of the establishment
of democracy in South Africa, the Independent Electoral Commis-
sion (IEC) was established in 1993 to administer the election
process and promote free elections.76 The IEC’s role in ensuring
free and fair elections was enshrined in the 1996 post-apartheid
Constitution, which mandates that the IEC “manage elections of
national, provincial and municipal legislative bodies in accordance
with national legislation.”77 These elections are held every five
years,78 and are based on a proportional representation voting sys-
tem: individuals vote for political parties, and each party is allotted
a number of seats based on its share of the vote.79
South Africa held its first post-apartheid elections in 1994. These
elections were logistically challenging: the number of citizens eligi-
ble to vote had increased from three million people to eighteen
million people, many of whom did not have governmental identifi-
cation documents, and the newly formed IEC did not use the voting
74. Eleanor Lamb, 50 States Reached Out for Cyber Help, but DHS Says Election Hack Unlikely,
MERITALK (Nov. 7, 2016) https://www.meritalk.com/articles/50-states-reached-out-for-cyber-
help-but-dhs-says-election-hack-unlikely/.
75. Apartheid encompasses a set of official policies of racial segregation established by
the South African government. See South Africa: Overcoming Apartheid, Building Democracy,
http://overcomingapartheid.msu.edu/index.php (last visited Jan. 21, 2017); Katie
Nodjimbadem, A Look Back at South Africa Under Apartheid, Twenty-Five Years After Its Repeal,
SMITHSONIAN (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/what-did-apartheid-
south-africa-look-180956945/?no-ist.
76. Independent Electoral Commission Act 150 of 1993 (S. Afr.) http://us-cdn.creamer
media.co.za/assets/articles/attachments/23001_act150-93.pdf see Electoral Commission Act
51 of 1995, 13 (S. Afr.) http://www.elections.org.za/content/Documents/Laws-and-regula-
tions/Electorial-Commission/Electoral-Commission-Act-51-of-1996-including-Regulations/
(repealing the Independent Electoral Commission Act 150 of 1993).
77. Chapter 9 Institutions—the Electoral Commission, LEAD SA (Mar. 17, 2014, 7:24 PM),
http://www.leadsa.co.za/articles/6711/chapter-9-institutions-the-electoral-commission.
78. Election Types, ELECTORAL COMM’N OF S. AFR., http://www.elections.org.za/content/
Elections/Election-types/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
79. Constanze Bauer, The 1994 and 1999 Electoral Process/Systems: Promoting Democracy in
South Africa, 6 AFR. J. POL. SCI. 105, 109 (2001).
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infrastructure utilized by the apartheid government.80 As these elec-
tions were an important turning point in South African democracy,
they were closely watched by both internal and external observers.81
Despite this scrutiny, significant problems arose during the 1994
elections, including apparent ballot stuffing,82 submission of ballot
boxes from nonexistent polling stations, and voting by underage
persons.83
The problems of the 1994 elections extended to the computing
infrastructure used to count the votes. The IEC had created a Man-
ual Verification Unit, which was tasked with manually duplicating
the computer-created tallies.84 This unit quickly discovered a dis-
crepancy between the manual and computer-created counts: for
“every vote that was counted for the ANC [African National Con-
gress],85 two other parties were getting either a 10% or 20% vote as
well.”86 This miscounting was caused by a program illicitly installed
on the IEC’s main computer87 that benefited parties opposed to the
ANC.88 After the tampering was discovered, the IEC created a “new
counting system with new computers” and hired clerks from exter-
nal audit firms to observe data entry.89 The hacker who installed
this program was never identified.90
After the difficulties of the 1994 elections, the IEC undertook
extensive reforms to ensure the security and reliability of the 1999
80. Amy Mawson, Organizing the First Post-Apartheid Election: South Africa, 1994, INNOVA-
TIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL SOCIETIES, 2010, http://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/sites/
successfulsocieties/files/Policy_Note_ID114.pdf.
81. See United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA), UNITED NATIONS, https:/
/search.archives.un.org/united-nations-observer-mission-in-south-africa-unomsa (last visited
Jan. 21, 2017).
82. Bob Drogin, Ballot Fraud casts Shadow on S. Africa Vote, L.A. TIMES (May 6, 1994),
http://articles.latimes.com/1994-05-06/news/mn-54514_1_ballot-fraud (“‘There were
sealed ballot boxes in which there were 3,000-odd votes, and all the ballots were neatly
stacked up inside,’ explained John Willis, a lawyer and election observer in Empangeni. ‘It’s
physically impossible if people are voting one by one.’”).
83. Id.
84. Mawson, supra note 80, at 14.
85. The ANC, a South African political party that advocated against discrimination and
was banned under apartheid, was the eventual winner of the election.  Nelson Mandela
served as ANC president. A Brief History of the African National Congress, AFR. NAT’L CONG.,
http://www.anc.org.za/content/brief-history-anc (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
86. Mawson, supra note 80, at 14.
87. Paul Taylor, Sabotage Claims Stall S. African Vote Count, WASH. POST (May 5, 1994),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/05/05/sabotage-claims-stall-s-afri-
can-vote-count/65696691-5930-4864-912d-09e500653f53/.
88. Aislinn Laing, Election Won by Mandela ‘Rigged by Opposition’, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 24,
2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/southafrica/
8084053/Election-won-by-Mandela-rigged-by-opposition.html.  The National Party, Freedom
Front Party, and Inkatha Freedom Party benefited from the computer tampering.
89. Mawson, supra note 80, at 14.
90. Laing, supra note 88.
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elections. These reforms included “a nationwide satellite-based
wide-area network and infrastructure; a bar-code system used to reg-
ister 18.4 million voters in just nine days; a geographic information
system used to create voting districts; a national common voters’
role [sic]; a sophisticated election results centre for managing the
process; and the training of 300,000 people.”91 The IEC was
awarded a Computerworld Smithsonian Award in 2000 for its actions
to create a secure and fair election.92
As a result of these reforms, the South African election process
now includes many procedures aimed at ensuring a secure and fair
election. Potential voters in South Africa must register in person at
an IEC office and present appropriate government identification.93
After a voter has applied for registration, they receive a bar-coded
sticker, which is scanned when they arrive at the polling place.94
The registration sticker is stamped and the voter’s thumb is marked
with ink to prevent repeat voting.95 The voter is then issued paper
ballots, which they complete in a private compartment and place in
a sealed ballot box.96
Votes are tabulated at a counting station, which is protected by
security officers tasked with ensuring that no one interferes with the
counting process.97 Votes are first sorted based on the political
party indicated on the ballot; both impartial observers and repre-
sentatives from political parties observe each ballot to ensure that
“a single party is identifiable on the ballot paper, and that the ballot
paper has been properly issued and bears the official voting station
stamp on the back.”98 The ballots for each political party are placed
on separate tables where they are counted by an IEC official. The
91. RICHARD HEEKS, E-GOVERNMENT IN AFRICA: PROMISE AND PRACTICE (2002), https://
pdfs.semanticscholar.org/473d/b0a40b98d8365d0b3c6191d9351ddc7ac0bb.pdf.
92. Linda Rosencrance, Technology Innovators Presented with Smithsonian Awards, COM-
PUTERWORLD (June 8, 2000, 1:00 AM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2595901/it-
management/technology-innovators-presented-with-smithsonian-awards.html.
93. Potential voters must register with a bar-coded ID book, smartcard ID, or Temporary
Identity Certificate.  Driver’s licenses and passports are not on the list of approved forms of
identification. How do I Register?, ELECTORAL COMM’N OF S. AFR., http://www.elections.
org.za/content/For-Voters/How-do-I-register-/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
94. Voting: How it Works, ELECTORAL COMM’N OF S. AFR., http://www.elections.org.za/
content/Elections/Voting/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. South Africa: Handbook for Counting Officers and Enumerators, ACE PROJECT, http://
aceproject.org/ero-en/topics/vote-counting/Manual-South%20Africa.pdf/view (last visited
Nov. 28, 2016); see also The Counting Process, ELECTORAL COMM’N OF S. AFR., http://www.elec-
tions.org.za/content/uploadedImages/counting-process.jpg?n=7097 (last visited Jan. 21,
2017).
98. Id.
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counting officials then switch places and a different official re-
counts the ballots at each table. This process is repeated until two
identical, consecutive counts are achieved.99 Political party repre-
sentatives observe the counting process; they must either challenge
the vote count or sign the completed tally of votes.100 These results
are then transmitted to the municipal electoral office.101
Altogether, the implemented reforms have contributed to signifi-
cant improvements in South African election security from the
1994 election issues, making it a model of African voting best prac-
tices with implications even for the United States. In particular, the
South African experience illustrates the types of policies that can, if
widely implemented and enforced, result in significant security im-
provements. It is difficult to see whether such improvements may
be possible in the U.S. context without an accompanying designa-
tion of elections as CI to help focus attention and resources.
C. Estonia
Much like South Africa, Estonia’s approach to protecting CI and
to using IT in elections is rooted in its particular history and
demographics. The modern Republic of Estonia has experienced
phenomenal economic growth over the last two decades, powered
in large part by its market and telecom policy choices.102 With a
land area slightly smaller than Vermont and New Hampshire com-
bined103 and a population of about 1.3 million people (roughly the
size of San Diego), Estonia benefited from a “fast and comprehen-
sive break from the Soviet-type economic system” in the mid-
1990s.104 In addition, in the late 1990s Estonia began investing heav-
ily in computing and network infrastructure, brought Internet
access and computers to all Estonian schools, and passed national
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. In 1995, Estonia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was $4.374 billion; in 2005, it was
$14.006 billion; and in 2015, it was $22.691 billion. Estonia, WORLD BANK, http://data.world
bank.org/country/estonia (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
103. ESTONIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/print/country/countrypdf_en.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/2015
0404192412/https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print/
country/countrypdf_en.pdf].
104. Runno Lumiste, Robert Pefferly & Alari Purju, Estonia’s Economic Development: Trends,
Practices, and Sources, COMM’N ON GROWTH & DEV. 3 (Working Paper No. 25, 2008), http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPREMNET/Resources/489960-1338997241035/Growth_
Commission_Working_Paper_25_Estonia_Economic_Development_Trends_Practices_Sour
ces_Case_Study.pdf.
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electronic ID card and other legislation that proved foundational
for establishing its digital infrastructure.105 As a result, Estonia has
been called “the most advanced digital society in the world,” and it
was the world’s first country to use an Internet voting system—for
local elections in 2005, and for national elections in 2007.106
The Estonian government explicitly recognizes that its highly ad-
vanced e-government services result in a “dependency on the
proper functioning of IT solutions.”107 As such, the Estonian Infor-
mation System Authority (RIA), a subdivision of the Ministry of
Economic Affairs and Communications, is charged with supervising
“information systems used to provide vital services” and implement-
ing “security measures of the information assets related to them.”108
More specifically, the “Section of Critical Information Infrastruc-
ture Protection” within RIA is responsible for protecting public and
private sector information systems that ensure the functioning of
“vital services” in Estonia.109
As defined in the Emergency Act, Estonia recognizes forty-three
“vital services,” including the functioning of the data communica-
tion network and the functioning of the mobile telephone
network.110 Both networks are vital to Estonia’s system of Internet
voting or “I-voting,” which has been possible via Internet-connected
computer and government-issued national electronic ID card111
since 2005, and via mobile phone and SIM card since 2011.112 I-
voting has been utilized in eight local, parliamentary, and Euro-
pean Parliament elections, with the percentage of Estonian citizens
105. Id. at 33–34; How We Got There: Estonia’s Road to a Digital Society, E-ESTONIA, https://e-
estonia.com/the-story/how-we-got-there/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2017); Electronic ID Card, E-ES-
TONIA, https://e-estonia.com/?component=electronic-id-card (last visited Jan. 21, 2017); Tim
Mansel, How Estonia became E-stonia, BBC NEWS (May 16, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/
business-22317297.
106. Ben Hammersley, Why You Should Be an E-Resident of Estonia, WIRED (Feb. 4, 2015),
www.wired.co.uk/article/estonia-e-resident; Estonian Internet voting system, ESTONIA.EU, http:/
/estonia.eu/about-estonia/economy-a-it/e-voting.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2017); Facts, E-ES-
TONIA, https://e-estonia.com/facts/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2017); e-Estonia, ESTONIA.EU, http://
estonia.eu/about-estonia/economy-a-it/e-estonia.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
107. Critical Information Infrastructure Protection, REP. OF ESTONIA INFO. SYS. AUTH., https://
www.ria.ee/en/ciip.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
108. Information System Authority, REP. OF ESTONIA INFO. SYS. AUTH., https://www.ria.ee/
en/about-estonian-information-system-authority.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
109. Critical Information Infrastructure Protection, supra note 107.
110. Emergency Act, RIIGI TEATAJA § 34 (2009) (Est.), https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/
ee/529012016001/consolide/current (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
111. Estonian Internet Voting System, ESTONIA.EU, estonia.eu/about-estonia/economy-a-it/e-
voting.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).  Ninety-four percent of Estonians have a national
electronic ID card, which is used for many e-government services. Electronic ID Card, E-ESTO-
NIA, https://e-estonia.com/component/electronic-id-card/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
112. Estonian Internet Voting System, supra note 111; i-Voting, E-ESTONIA, https://e-estonia.
com/?component=i-voting (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
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opting for I-voting increasing nearly every election—from 1.9% in
2005 to 30.5% in 2015.113 In 2012, Estonia established an “Elec-
tronic Voting Committee” to “prepare and organise electronic
voting, to resolve any cases hindering electronic voting pursuant to
law, and to verify the results of electronic voting.”114 Before the
2014 European Parliament election, Tarvi Martens, Head of the
Committee, presented on I-voting, asserting that “Internet voting is
here to stay,” and that “I-voting is as natural as Internet-banking but
even more secure,” and that trust is at the center of “what it takes”
for I-voting to be successful.115
However, on May 12, 2014, just before the European Parliament
election, an “international team of independent experts” identified
“major risks in the security of Estonia’s Internet voting system.”116
The team, which included representatives from the U.K.’s Open
Rights Team and the University of Michigan, as well as an indepen-
dent security researcher, observed operations at an Estonian
election center during the 2013 local elections and described nu-
merous operational security lapses and risks.117 But on May 14, Anto
Veldre of CERT-EE (Estonia’s Cyber Emergency Response Team, a
subdivision of Estonia’s RIA),118 disputed the team’s assertions.  In
particular, CERT-EE cited a need for more evidence (i.e., technical
descriptions of the attacks, which could be shared discreetly with
the government); a disconnect in the understanding of Estonia’s
Internet (rather than “electronic”) voting via ID card, which relies
on Estonia’s nationally supported Public Key Infrastructure system;
and the fact that, in Estonia’s experience, the risk of falsifying pa-
per votes may be considered as more of a threat than is falsifying
digital votes.119 Estonia’s ongoing investments in its “e-society” are
113. See Internet Voting in Estonia, VABARIIGI VALIMISKOMISJON, http://www.vvk.ee/voting-
methods-in-estonia/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).  Percentage of votes cast using I-voting: 2005
(local): 1.9%; 2007 (parliamentary): 5.5%; 2009 (European Parliament): 14.7%; 2009 (local):
15.8%; 2011 (parliamentary): 24.3%; 2014 (European Parliament): 31.3%; 2015 (parliamen-
tary): 30.5%. i-Voting, supra note 112.
114. Electronic Voting Committee, VABARIIGI VALIMISKOMISJON, http://www.vvk.ee/general-
info/electronic-voting-committee/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
115. TARVI MARTENS, ELEC. VOTING COMM., INTERNET VOTING IN ESTONIA, http://lata.
org.lv/wp-content/conf/Drosiba/LATA_EST_iVelesanas_TarviMartens.pdf (last visited Jan.
21, 2017).
116. Press Release, Independent Report on E-voting in Estonia, Ahead of European Par-
liamentary Elections an International Team of Independent Experts Identifies Major Risks in
the Security of Estonia’s Internet Voting System and Recommends Its Immediate Withdrawal
(May 12, 2014), https://estoniaevoting.org/press-release/.
117. Id.
118. About CERT Estonia, REP. OF ESTONIA INFO. SYS. AUTH., https://www.ria.ee/en/cert-
estonia.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
119. Anto Veldre, E-voting is (Too) Secure, REP. OF ESTONIA INFO. SYS. AUTH. (May 14,
2014), https://www.ria.ee/en/e-voting-is-too-secure.html.
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critical to its approach and adherence to I-voting, and its apparent
trust in digital records is evident elsewhere in its government. For
instance, the authoritative version of Estonia’s laws, including the
above-mentioned Emergency Act and the law that established the
Electronic Voting Committee, are maintained online, in the “Elek-
trooniline Riigi Teataja” (Eletronic State Gazette), which is
modeled after the paper-based Riigi Teataja.
The Estonian government is also implementing measures to in-
crease I-voting security. For example, in 2013 it began
implementing individual vote verification, giving smart device-hold-
ing and QR code–familiar voters the ability to check if their vote
had been cast and counted as intended.120 According to research by
Mihkel Solvak and Kristjan Vassil of the University of Tartu in coop-
eration with the Estonian National Electoral Committee, only 3.7,
4.7, and 4.7% of I-voting Estonians used the verification technology
in 2013, 2014, and 2015.121 However, as Solvak and Vassil note,
8,439 Estonians used the verification technology in 2015—nearly
the number of Estonians that used the Internet to vote in 2005—
and adoption of new technology takes time.122 Additionally, in July
2016, the Estonian government hired the Norwegian technology
company Cybernetica to overhaul and regularly maintain its elec-
tronic voting system software, which had been originally created in
2004.123 According to Tarvi Martens, “the new system will be more
universal, allowing more possible applications, in addition to using
it for Estonian nation-wide elections and referendums—such as in-
ternal elections of large corporations, local government polls and
also abroad.”124
With no publicly reported cyber incidents related to its I-voting
system, Estonia is powering ahead, and its election system technol-
ogy may even be marketed beyond the Estonian government. But,
as Martens admits, trust will likely continue to be central to the suc-
cess of I-voting. Solvak’s and Vassil’s research captured how, in
120. What is Verification of I-votes?, VABARIIGI VALIMISKOMISJON, http://www.vvk.ee/public/
Verification_of_I-Votes.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
121. MIHKEL SOLVAK & KRISTJAN VASSIL, E-VOTING IN ESTONIA: TECHNOLOGICAL DIFFUSION
AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS OVER TEN YEARS (2005–2015), 132 (2016), http://skytte.ut.ee/
sites/default/files/skytte/e_voting_in_estonia_vassil_solvak_a5_web.pdf.  The authors cite
low penetration of smart devices and limited familiarity with QR code in older generations as
possible issues.
122. Id.
123. Cybernetica Selected to Renew Estonian Internet Voting Software, CYBERNETICA NEWS (July
27, 2016), https://cyber.ee/en/news/cybernetica-selected-to-renew-estonian-internet-voting-
software/.
124. Estonian Internet Voting System to be Rewritten from Scratch, ESTONIAN CYBER SECURITY
NEWS AGGREGATOR (Aug. 2, 2016), https://cybersec.ee/2016/08/02/estonian-internet-vot
ing-system-to-be-rewritten-from-scratch/.
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2013–15, trust in Internet voting was polarized but overall relatively
high (i.e., higher than in other Estonian government institu-
tions).125 Moreover, distrust of Internet voting is lowest among
Estonians who are not yet aware of the individual vote verification
technology, which only began to be available in 2013.126 Indeed,
changing Estonian public opinion may not be easily deterred; de-
spite a very significant distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack
on Estonian government websites in 2007,127 I-voting has become
increasingly popular. However, as with CI more broadly, greater de-
pendency may lead to additional consequences, and a serious
attack on Estonia’s I-voting may not only impact future elections
but also Estonia’s broader digital society. That being said, Estonia’s
embrace of technology along with its emphasis on secure voting
and decision to designate elections as CI has helped it mitigate the
risk to its democracy, lessons that should not be lost on U.S. policy-
makers as is discussed further in Part III.
D. Germany
Germany has a parliamentary system that elects a large legislative
body, the Bundestag,128 composed of representatives from across
the sixteen states that in turn appoint a head of government. A
smaller legislative body, the Bundesrat, contains members directly
appointed by these state governments. The Federal President is the
head of state, a largely ceremonial role, appointed by a convention
composed of all Bundestag members and delegates from the six-
teen states. The Bundestag is the primary avenue for German
voters’ influence on the composition of their government.129 There
are 598 seats, of which half are directly elected and half are propor-
tionally allocated according to party lists.130 Voters have two votes.
The first is used to select a representative affiliated with a party
from among a range of candidates for the district seat. The second
vote is used to select a party, whose allocation of total seats in the
Bundestag is then determined by the proportion of these second
125. SOLVAK & VASSIL, supra note 121, at 133–34.
126. Id. at 133.
127. Joshua Davis, Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe, WIRED (Aug. 21,
2007), https://www.wired.com/2007/08/ff-estonia/.
128. How Does Germany’s Electoral System Work? ECONOMIST (Sept. 11, 2013, 11:50 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/09/economist-explains-3.
129. See id.
130. Leon Mangasarian, How Germany’s Election System Works: What to Watch for Today,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 21, 2013, 6:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-09-
21/how-germany-s-election-system-works-what-to-watch-for-today.
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votes received. In some cases, the number of seats awarded accord-
ing to this first vote (direct method) and second vote (proportional
method) are out of sync. Seats can never be taken away from a party
but so-called “overhang mandates” can be awarded to a party if they
receive more second vote seats than first.131 This means that the size
of the Bundestag varies from session to session and that accuracy in
ballot tabulation is critically important, highlighting the impor-
tance of mitigating that vulnerability in the election system.
In 2009, the German Federal Constitutional Court heard a case
contesting the use of electronic voting machines during the 2005
Bundestag elections. The equipment in question were DRE ma-
chines, used to record votes on election day and store them in
memory for later tabulation.132 These particular electronic voting
machines (EVMs), manufactured by a Dutch technology company
called Nedap, required votes to be tabulated using a separate device
and printed on a paper record to verify the electronic memory’s
contents.133 These Nedap EVMs had been used for elections in the
Netherlands until 2006, when a group of researchers demonstrated
their vulnerability to manipulation in under five minutes.134 The
Dutch government had subsequently banned the devices.135
In Germany, which used EVMs very similar to those from the
Dutch elections, researchers asserted that the devices violated a por-
tion of the German Basic Law, which requires that “all essential
steps of an election are subject to the possibility of public scrutiny
unless other constitutional interests justify an exception.”136 The
suit claimed that, because the votes were stored in memory and
then tabulated using a separate device, the voter was unable to ver-
ify the integrity of their vote as required by law, and thus the system
was unconstitutional.137 The German Constitutional Court agreed,
and ruled against the use of the machines in the 2009 elections,
though it declined to overturn the results without more evidence of
131. Germany’s Voting System Explained, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Sept. 19, 2013, 4:43 PM), http://
www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-election-system-explained-a-923243.html.
132. See Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs), INT’L FOUND. FOR ELECTORAL SYS. (Nov. 20,
2014), https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/electronic_voting_machines.pdf.
133. Wahlcomputer, CHAOS COMPUTER CLUB BERLIN, https://berlin.ccc.de/wiki/Wahlmas-
chinen (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
134. See ROP GONGGRIJP ET AL., NEDAP/GROENENDAAL ES3B VOTING COMPUTER: A SECUR-
ITY ANALYSIS (2006), http://wijvertrouwenstemcomputersniet.nl/images/9/91/Es3b-en.pdf.
135. Id.; Hari K. Prasad et al., Security Analysis of India’s Electronic Voting Machines, PROC.
17TH ACM CONF. ON COMPUTER AND COMM. SECURITY, Oct. 2010, https://indiaevm.org/
evm_tr2010-jul29.pdf.
136. Press Release, Bundesverfassungsgericht, Use of Voting Computers in 2005
Bundestag Election Unconstitutional (Mar. 3, 2009), https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht
.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2009/bvg09-019.html.
137. Id.
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fraud, arguing that the average voter should be able to interpret
and reliably scrutinize the ballot without special training or “de-
tailed knowledge of computer technology.”138 The Court ruled that
the basic law did not prohibit EVMs outright, but that its require-
ments could not be satisfied by the provision of extensive security
measures or official sampling and testing of a limited number of
machines for accuracy.139 The EVMs in use did not satisfy the re-
quirements of public scrutiny because:
. . . votes were exclusively recorded electronically on a vote
recording module, [so] neither voters nor electoral boards
nor citizens who were present at the polling station were able
to verify the unadulterated recording of the votes cast . . . ,
[and] the essential steps of the ascertainment of the result
could not be retraced by the public.140
Germany has not employed EVMs since the Court’s ruling in 2009.
This follows the 2006 ban in the Netherlands and a period of con-
troversy in Ireland over their use between 2004 and 2009, ultimately
resulting in a return to paper ballots.141
Germany’s categorization of CI seems to include voting machines
and tabulation equipment. The German definition of CI includes
“organizational and physical structures and facilities of such vital
importance to a nation’s society and economy that their failure or
degradation would result in sustained supply shortages, significant
disruption of public safety and security, or other dramatic conse-
quences.”142 This has led to the classification of a number of
technical and services infrastructure sectors as CI, including drink-
ing water supply and emergency services, as well as several broader
categories including media, “cultural objects,” and public adminis-
tration.143 Elections infrastructure could also be considered as part
of “public administration.” A similar categorization could be made
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. E-Voting Machines to be Scrapped, IRISH TIMES (June 29 2012, 1:00 AM), http://www.
irishtimes.com/news/e-voting-machines-to-be-scrapped-1.722896.
142. National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP Strategy), FED. MINISTRY OF THE
INTERIOR (June 17, 2009), http://www.kritis.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/BBK/EN/
CIP-Strategy.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.
143. Maureen Connolly, Emergency Management in the Federal Republic of Germany: Preserving
its Critical Infrastructures from Hazardous Natural Events and Terrorist Acts, in FEMA, ACADEMIC
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND RELATED COURSES FOR THE HIGHER EDUCATION PROGRAM COM-
PARATIVE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT BOOK (2014), https://training.fema.gov/hiedu/aemrc/
booksdownload/compemmgmtbookproject/.
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under the European Union’s criteria for the identification of CI,
one branch of which considers “public effects,” including negative
impacts on public confidence.144 Such a clarification could help
provide further enforcement powers to both German and EU au-
thorities that would help secure German elections going forward.
E. Brazil
As the largest democracy in Latin America, the Federative Re-
public of Brazil utilizes DRE voting machines to account for
approximately 120 million voters.145 Brazil’s DRE machines—
urnas—feature two terminals: (1) “an election officer terminal used
to authenticate electors by their registration number or finger-
print”; and (2) “a voter terminal where votes are cast.”146 In terms of
mitigating the risk of system malfunctions (e.g., a power failure),
the urnas are equipped with a battery as a secondary power
source.147
Electronic voting first began in Brazil in 1996 for the purposes of
“ensur[ing] secrecy and accuracy of the election process, as well as
speed” and became commonplace across all voting precincts by
2000.148 Historically, the country’s efforts in developing and imple-
menting electronic voting devices has been described as
pioneering,149 and the urnas garnered acclaim for both their mobil-
ity and their affordability.150 In the past, Brazil’s government has
provided technical guidance on voting systems to countries includ-
ing Argentina, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, India, and
Ukraine.151 Despite this, U.S. computer scientists have criticized
144. Council Directive 2008/114/EC, art. 3, 2008 O.J. (L345) 75, 78 (EC), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008L0114&from=EN.
145. See How Brazil Has Put an “e” in Vote, BBC NEWS (Oct. 1, 2008, 9:17 AM), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7644751.stm [hereinafter BBC NEWS]; Leslie Mira, For Brazil Voters, Ma-
chines Rule, WIRED (Jan. 24, 2004), http://www.wired.com/2004/01/for-brazil-voters-mach
ines-rule/.
146. See Diego F. Aranha et al., Software Vulnerabilities in the Brazilian Voting Machine, in
DESIGN, DEVELOPMENT, AND THE USE OF SECURE ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS (Dimotrios Zissiz
& Dimitrios Lekkas eds., 2014), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260870433_Soft
ware_vulnerabilities_IN_the_Brazilian_voting_machineb.
147. See Mira, supra note 145.
148. See Angelica Mari, Fraud Possible in Brazil’s e-Voting System, BRAZIL TECH (Oct. 3, 2014),
http://www.zdnet.com/article/fraud-possible-in-brazils-e-voting-system.
149. See BBC NEWS, supra note 145.
150. See Mira, supra note 145.
151. See id.
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Brazil’s voting machines, as maintained by Diebold Election Sys-
tems, for being “vulnerable to tampering,” because of diminished
transparency from not maintaining an auditable paper trail.152
Interestingly, while the urnas once utilized printers to maintain
an auditable paper trail, in the fall of 2003 the Brazilian legislature
voted to abandon printing e-voting receipts.153 This decision to
modify the urnas drew the ire of technologists, like University of
Campinas Brazil professor Diego Aranha, who reasoned that “there
is a constant danger of large-scale software fraud, as well as other
non-technical tampering that could be perpetrated by former or
current electoral justice staff and go totally undetected.”154 Simi-
larly, in an interview with Wired, Professor Michael Stanton of
Universidade Federal Fluminense decried the government’s deci-
sion to abandon a paper trail in order to reduce costs: “Obviously
there’s a cost (for paper receipts), but on some things you don’t
skimp.”155
A surprising development in Brazil’s e-voting system arose in De-
cember 2015. As a result of an economic recession and “substantial
cuts in public spending,” the state announced a return to paper-
based voting and manual ballot processing in the 2016 election.156
Given the legislature’s decision in 2003 to abandon printing to save
roughly $100 million,157 it is striking that the state ultimately re-
turned to paper ballots in 2016, due to financial considerations. In
sum, Brazil’s history of e-voting and cost-management approach
here offers a cautionary tale to other countries that are evaluating
the short-term gains from abandoning a voter-verified paper trail
audit.
F. India
It is no secret that Indian officials regard their electronic voting
machines with a sense of national pride, describing them as among
the most “tamperproof.”158 As the world’s largest democracy, India
deploys approximately 1.4 million electronic voting machines for
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See Mari, supra note 148.
155. See Mira, supra note 145.
156. See Brazil: Due to Recession Brazil Cans e-Voting, Verified Voting Found. (Dec. 2, 2015),
http://thevotingnews.com/international/south-america/brazil/.
157. See Mira, supra note 145.
158. See Julian Siddle, U.S. Scientists ‘Hack’ India Electronic Voting Machines, BBC NEWS (May
18, 2010), http://www.bbc.com/news/10123478.
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general elections,159 and utilizes a polling place-based Internet vot-
ing system.160 According to Alok Shukla, India’s former Deputy
Election Commissioner, in a 2010 BBC interview, “[i]t is not just
the machine, but the overall administrative safeguards which we use
that make it absolutely impossible for anybody to open the ma-
chine.”161 In terms of the machine’s design, voting record data and
candidate information are captured onto “purpose-built computer
chips.”162 Thus, absent any software to exploit, the computer chip
raises the bar for manipulating votes at any scale, because one
would first need physical access, as well as the resources, to install
compromised microchips for many of the machines.163 Another ad-
ministrative safeguard, as Shukla described, is that “[b]efore the
elections take place, the machine is set in the presence of the candi-
dates and their representatives. These people are allowed to put
their seal [paper and wax] on the machine, and nobody can open
the machine without breaking the seals.”164 If the paper and wax
seals are broken, this physical evidence can alert Indian election
commission officials.165
The main benefits of India’s polling place–based Internet voting
system, as described by Elections Canada, a non-partisan research
entity, are that the system is primed to void mismarked or invalid
ballots, results can be quickly tabulated, and foreign language and
font size fields can be easily changed to accommodate the special
needs of voters.166 In contrast, the drawbacks associated with this
system are that voters can inadvertently exit voting screens before
their ballot can be properly cast, the high cost of maintaining the
equipment, and the lack of a voter-verified paper trail audit.167
In summary, while India’s e-voting system is impressively de-
signed, no device is tamperproof. Indeed, in 2010, a team of
computer scientists at the University of Michigan, led by Professor J.
Alex Halderman, discovered a significant vulnerability that allowed
159. See id.
160. See A Comparative Assessment of Electronic Voting Machines, ELECTIONS CANADA (June 3,
2014), http://elections.ca/content.aspx?section=res&dir=rec/tech/ivote/comp&document=
benefit&lang=e.
161. Siddle, supra note 158.
162. Id.
163. See id. (explaining that “to have any impact [manipulating votes] they would need to
install their microchips on many voting machines, no easy task when 1,368,430 were used in
the last general election in 2009”).
164. Id.
165. See id.
166. See A Comparative Assessment of Electronic Voting Machines, supra note 160.
167. See id.
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them to manipulate Indian voter data by using a homemade elec-
tronic device.168 According to Professor Halderman, by concealing
a microprocessor and Bluetooth radio in the machine, their
“lookalike display board intercepts the vote totals that the machine
is trying to display and replaces them with dishonest totals—basi-
cally whatever the bad guy wants to show up at the end of the
election.”169 The researchers also posted a YouTube video on how
the AVC voting machine could be compromised by using return-
oriented programing.170 Using this “invisible vote-stealing” tech-
nique, the video reveals how three votes cast for George
Washington could be easily shifted to Benedict Arnold, absent any
auditable paper trail to verify votes.171 Thus, like Brazil, the India
case study serves as a sobering reminder that no voting machine,
however sophisticated, is impervious to manipulation.
G. Summary
This Part summarized the experiences of the United States,
South Africa, Estonia, Brazil, Germany, and India in securing their
elections. These countries evince a variety of approaches and suc-
cess rates run the gamut. Of the country studies, Germany and
Brazil have returned to paper ballots after experimenting with vot-
ing machines. In contrast, Estonia has gone the furthest in
embracing electronic voting, though its relatively small population
and robust program of national identity cards backed by public-key
encryption makes its system difficult to replicate in large, diverse
democracies. That being said, India boasts a nationwide system of
electronic voting machines that, while not tamperproof, possess sig-
nificant security features that could be copied by other
jurisdictions. And the United States has, to date, undertaken a
largely voluntary effort, with the DHS and the EAC working with
state and local elections officials to test and certify voting machines.
The next Part of the paper builds from this comparative data on
state practice to inform a discussion of norm building in this space.
168. See Siddle, supra note 158 (Professor Halderman explains, “We made an imitation
display board [of the Indian voting machine] that looks almost exactly like the real display in
the machines . . . .”).
169. Id.
170. JacobsSchoolNews., Computer Scientists Take Over Electronic Voting Machine with New
Programming Technique, YOUTUBE (Aug. 10, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lsfG
3KPrD1I.
171. See id.
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III. THE GLOBAL DIMENSION
As Part II illustrated, the problem of voting security is increas-
ingly a common concern shared around the world by advanced
democracies and emerging markets alike. While solutions to this
problem range widely from a federated system of experimentation
in the United States to Germany’s and Brazil’s decisions to ban vot-
ing machines outright due to security and financial concerns,
respectively, this common issue provides fruitful ground for inter-
national cybersecurity norm building. This Part briefly summarizes
recent developments in the field, particularly in the CI context,
before couching these findings within the lens of polycentric gov-
ernance. We conclude with a summary and discussion of
implications for policymakers.
A. Minilateral Cyber Norm Building
According to Professors Ron Diebert and Masachi Crete-
Nishihata, “states learn from and imitate” one another, and “[t]he
most intense forms of imitation and learning occur around national
security issues because of the high stakes and urgency involved.”172
In part because of many states’ perception that cyber risk is “escalat-
ing out of control,” there exists an opportunity to engage in
constructive international dialogue on norm building,173 particu-
larly given the international political difficulties involved with new
treaty formation in this dynamic space.174 Potential cyber norms
could include a duty to cooperate with victim nations if an attack
occurred through information systems in a state’s territory, and a
duty of care to secure systems and warn potential victims.175 The
172. Ronald J. Deibert & Masachi Crete-Nishihata, Global Governance and the Spread of
Cyberspace Controls, 18 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 339, 350 (2012).
173. James A. Lewis, Confidence-Building and International Agreement in Cybersecurity, in DIS-
ARMAMENT FORUM: CONFRONTING CYBERCONFLICT 51, 52 (2011). Though norms do not bind
states like a treaty, Lewis notes that “[n]on-proliferation provides many examples of non-
binding norms that exercise a powerful influence on state behavior.” Id. at 53.  This position
has also been supported by other scholars. See, e.g., ROGER HURWITZ, AN AUGMENTED SUM-
MARY OF THE HARVARD, MIT AND U. OF TORONTO CYBER NORMS WORKSHOP 5 (2011), http://
ecir.mit.edu/images/stories/augmented-summary-4%201.pdf (noting that “[a]t the very
least, acceptance of a norm by a state puts the state’s reputation at risk. If it fails to follow the
norm, other states which accept that norm, will typically demand an explanation or account,
rather than ignoring the violation or dismissing it as self-interested behavior.”).
174. For more on this topic, see SCOTT J. SHACKELFORD, MANAGING CYBER ATTACKS IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW, BUSINESS, AND RELATIONS: IN SEARCH OF CYBER PEACE 312–66 (2014).
175. Eneken Tikk, Ten Rules of Behavior for Cyber Security, 53 SURVIVAL 119, 124–25, 127–28
(2011).
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Obama administration encouraged the development of norms for
respecting intellectual property; mitigating cybercrime; valuing pri-
vacy; and working toward global interoperability, reliable access,
multi-stakeholder governance, and cybersecurity due diligence.176
Yet despite the “general agreement on a norms-based approach” to
enhancing cybersecurity,177 “even simple norms face serious opposi-
tion. Conflicting political agendas, covert military actions,
espionage and competition for global influence” have created a dif-
ficult context for cyber norm development and diffusion.178
Consequently, to be successful, norms must be “clear, useful, and
do-able,”179 such as by beginning with areas of common concern
like protecting critical infrastructure.180
Positive progress was made in 2015–16 in relation to the distilla-
tion and propagation of cybersecurity norms that may be applied to
enhancing election security. The G2 Cybersecurity Code of Con-
duct between the United States and China, for example, calls for
mutual restraint in economic cyberespionage, particularly the theft
of trade secrets.181 It could be expanded to include mutual respect
for one another’s political parties and election infrastructure—a
value dearly held by the Chinese leadership.182
Similarly, the G7 continued its work on cybersecurity in 2016,
when it published its view that “no country should conduct or
knowingly support [information and communication technology-
enabled] theft of intellectual property” and that all G7 nations
should work to “preserve the global nature of the Internet,” includ-
ing the free flow of information in a nod to the notion of
176. WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE: PROSPERITY, SECURITY, AND
OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED WORLD 10 (May 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
sites/default/files/rss_viewer/internationalstrategy_cyberspace.pdf.
177. Lewis, supra note 173, at 55.
178. Id. at 58.
179. Martha Finnemore, Cultivating International Cyber Norms, in AMERICA’S CYBER FUTURE:
SECURITY AND PROSPERITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 87, 90 (Kristin M. Lord & Travis Sharp
eds., 2011).
180. See Richard A. Clarke, A Global Cyber-Crisis in Waiting, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-global-cyber-crisis-in-waiting/2013/02/07/81
2e024c-6fd6-11e2-ac36-3d8d9dcaa2e2_story.html?tid=wp_ipad; HURWITZ, supra note 173, at 8.
Over time, a hierarchy of cyber norms may also be established and married with escalating
sanctions as is common across a range of international legal instruments. Cf. Jure Vidmar,
Norm Conflicts and Hierarchy in International Law: Towards a Vertical International Legal System?,
in HIERARCHY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE PLACE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 13, 14 (Erika De Wet &
Jure Vidmar eds., 2012) (questioning “whether the jus cogens-based substantive norm hierar-
chy is more than theoretical”).
181. See Everett Rosenfeld, US–China Agree to Not Conduct Cybertheft of Intellectual Property,
CNBC (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/09/25/us-china-agree-to-not-conduct-
cybertheft-of-intellectual-property-white-house.html.
182. See id.
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cyberspace as a global networked commons.183 Such information
could explicitly include norms against outside interference with do-
mestic elections.
Finally, the United States proposed three peacetime norms that
were accepted for inclusion in the 2015 U.N. Group of Governmen-
tal Experts consensus report: protecting critical infrastructure,
safeguarding computer security incident response teams, and col-
laborating on cybercrime investigations.184 The former CI norm—
to which many of the cyber powers, including Russia, have already
agreed—could be leveraged to explicitly include elections.185
In summary, there is an opportunity for states to become “norm
entrepreneurs” identifying and hastening the uptake of cyber-
security best practices such as those pioneered in Estonia and
India.186 Such a bottom-up approach to international cybersecurity
policymaking is part and parcel of the literature on polycentric gov-
ernance, introduced next.
B. Applicability of Polycentric Governance
The field of polycentric (multi-centered) governance is a multi-
level, multi-purpose, multi-functional, and multi-sectoral model187
that has been championed by scholars, including Nobel Laureate
Elinor Ostrom and Professor Vincent Ostrom. It challenges ortho-
doxy by demonstrating the benefits of self-organization, networking
regulations “at multiple scales,”188 and examining the extent to
which national and private control can in some cases coexist with
183. G7 Leaders Approve Historic Cybersecurity Agreement, BOSTON GLOBAL FORUM, http://
bostonglobalforum.org/2016/06/g7-leaders-produce-historic-cybersecurity-agreement/ (last
visited Jan. 21, 2017).
184. See Rep. of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, U.N. Doc. A/
70/174 (July 22, 2015).
185. An earlier version of this research appeared as Scott Shackelford, Opinion: How to
Make Democracy Harder to Hack, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 29, 2016), http://www.
csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/Passcode-Voices/2016/0729/Opinion-How-to-make-de-
mocracy-harder-to-hack.
186. See TIM MAURER, CYBER NORM EMERGENCE AT THE UNITED NATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE ACTIVITIES AT THE UN REGARDING CYBER-SECURITY 47 (2011).
187. Michael D. McGinnis, An Introduction to IAD and the Language of the Ostrom Workshop:
A Simple Guide to a Complex Framework, 39 POL’Y STUD. J. 163, 171–72 (2011), http://
php.indiana.edu/~mcginnis/iad_guide.pdf.
188. Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems as One Approach for Solving Collective-Action Problems 1
(Ind. Univ. Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Working Paper Series No.
08–6, 2008), http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/4417/W08-6_Os
trom_DLC.pdf?sequence=1.
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communal management.189 The field also posits that, due to the
existence of free riders in a multipolar world, “a single governmen-
tal unit” is often incapable of managing “global collective action
problems” such as cyber attacks.190 Instead, a polycentric approach
recognizes that diverse organizations working at multiple levels can
create different types of policies that can increase levels of coopera-
tion and compliance, enhancing “flexibility across issues and
adaptability over time.”191 Such an approach, in other words, recog-
nizes both the common but differentiated responsibilities of public-
and private-sector stakeholders and the potential for best practices
to be identified and spread organically, generating positive network
effects that could, in time, result in the emergence of a cascade
toward CI protection generally, and voting security in particular.192
Indeed, popular attention is engaged in the problem of voting
cybersecurity in a way that has not happened before, with a
supermajority of sixty-six percent of respondents to one 2016 survey
saying that cyber criminals are influencing the outcomes of the
2016 election193—potentially laying the groundwork for action by
policymakers.
C. Implications for Policymakers
Previous research, including some cited in Part I, has identified
areas in which election infrastructure must improve. There are
practical steps states can take in order to make these improvements,
though it should be noted at the outset that, due to the huge range
of jurisdictions in play, there are limitations on what the federal
189. For a detailed discussion of early Internet history, see KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW
LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE: THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET (1996); Brief History of the
Internet, INTERNET SOC’Y, http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/what-internet/history-in-
ternet/brief-history-internet (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
190. Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change 35 (World Bank,
Policy Research Working Paper No. 5095, 2009), http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/pe/
2009/04268.pdf.
191. Robert O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate Change 9 PERSP.
ON POL. 7, 9 (2011); cf. Julia Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in
Polycentric Regulatory Regimes, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 137, 157 (2008) (discussing the legitimacy
of polycentric regimes, and arguing that “[a]ll regulatory regimes are polycentric to varying
degrees”).
192. See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 895–98 (1998).
193. See Survey: Cyber Criminals Possibly Influencing US Presidential Election, TRIPWIRE, (Aug.
11, 2016), http://www.tripwire.com/company/news/press-release/survey-cyber-criminals-
possibly-influencing-us-presidential-election/.
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government can or should do with regard to securing election in-
frastructure as CI. As such, some of these steps will necessarily be
carried out by local election administrators; these may be aided in-
directly by additional funding and attention made possible via a CI
designation. Other steps are of a more cross-cutting nature and
could benefit more directly from a federal role.
The first key decision in electoral preparation is that of which
technology to deploy. After the hanging chad incidents of 2000,
Congress passed HAVA (discussed in Part I), which outlawed punch
card machines and provided funding for new digital machines.
Many of these machines are still in use. The lesson of 2016, and of
previous cycles, should be that these systems are not always secure
against modern threats. State governments, perhaps aided by fed-
eral funding and attention accompanying a CI designation, should
ensure that their machines are hardened against the risk of hack-
ing. In many jurisdictions, this will likely mean buying new
machines, and outlawing optical scan technologies that do not
leave paper trails. As was seen in the case studies from Part II, those
countries that have made such proactive investments accompanying
a CI designation—including Estonia—have made important pro-
gress in securing their elections.
Going forward, it is vital that every voting system generate a voter-
verified paper audit trail as a bulwark against hacking and to build
trust—something that was missing in both the German and later
Brazilian approaches. This paper trail can be a ballot manually
marked by the voter and scanned by computer with the ballot re-
tained for later audits and recounts, as optical scan voting machines
do. Or it can be a paper ballot marked by machine, responding to
the inputs of the voter on a touch screen. If it is the latter design,
the paper ballot must be visible to the voter at some point during
the process for verification purposes.
In conjunction with the possible purchase of new machines, se-
curity audits and vulnerability scans of all machines and registration
systems are essential. These procedures can identify potential vec-
tors of attack ahead of time, and remediate them before hackers
can take advantage. As noted above, there is a long history of states
that employ such audits finding and fixing weaknesses, such as mis-
configured systems, problems with Internet-connected devices,
poor encryption, and weak passwords. These fixes directly improve
election security, and expanding the scope of this pre-election
preparation is an essential part of any credible cybersecurity
posture.
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Information sharing is another important component of mitigat-
ing the risk to voting machines, and there is an argument for
creating a voting ISAC or broader ISAO.194 The creation of such an
ISAC has become part of the standard response toolkit across a
range of industries following a breach—such as the retail ISAC af-
ter Target’s 2014 cyber attack, or the more recent automobile ISAC
after recent car hackings.195 These sharing centers provide a mecha-
nism for stakeholders to share data on vulnerabilities and threats
with one another to more quickly and effectively guard against
emerging threats.
During an election, electoral commissions should prepare for ir-
regularities and interference. As the previously discussed Ukraine
case shows, astute observation can spot malicious activity before it
achieves its objective. Authorities should therefore create verified,
secured, and redundant lines of communication with media organi-
zations to credibly share information in a timely manner. Media
should take care to be skeptical of hacking reports, so as to not sow
doubt where none need exist, but should also hold election author-
ities to account.
After an election, all jurisdictions should carry out what is known
as a risk-limiting audit.196 Such an audit samples an appropriate per-
centage of paper ballots to confirm that strong evidence exists that
the election outcome is correct. The percentage of ballots sampled
can be determined by statistical means and varies with the closeness
of an election. Such a mathematically rigorous sampling method is
efficient and, while it cannot guard against all electoral manipula-
tion, can provide a very high degree of certainty that any
manipulation that did occur did not change the outcome of the
election. Additionally, credible and standardized post-election audit
procedures could increase voter and candidate confidence in the
outcome.197 There is currently enormous range in the quality and
rigor of post-election procedures such as post-election audits.198
194. Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs), U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC.,
http://www.dhs.gov/isao (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
195. See Retail-ISAC Launches Cyber Sharing Portal Supported by FS-ISAC, PR NEWSWIRE (Mar.
24, 2015), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/retail-isac-launches-cyber-sharing-por-
tal-supported-by-fs-isac-300055086.html.
196. See Mark Lindeman & Philip B. Stark, A Gentle Introduction to Risk-limiting Audits,
IEEE SEC. (Mar. 16, 2012), https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~stark/Preprints/gentle12.pdf.
197. Mark Lindeman et al., Principles and Best Practices in Post Election Audits, ELECTION
AUDITS (2008), http://electionaudits.org/files/best practices final_0.pdf.
198. See Post Election Audits, VERIFIED VOTING FOUND., https://www.verifiedvoting.org/re-
sources/post-election-audits/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
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The Obama administration reportedly considered a full range of
tools in response to cyber attacks on U.S. election systems, includ-
ing public shaming, sanctions, and indictments.199 As with
preventing attacks on election infrastructure, it is equally vital to
have a clear understanding of the ramifications for designating
democratic processes as part of CI. As was discussed in Part I, there
are myriad benefits and drawbacks to such a delineation, and ulti-
mately there must be a balance that takes into account the
constitutional protections of federalism in U.S. elections. This
could take the form of the federal government acting predomi-
nantly as a resource for jurisdictions, though various incentives
could also be used to entice states to update their election laws and
boost security, such as “Race to the Top” funding reminiscent of
the education sector.200
One more obvious role for the federal government is to consider
how best to deter foreign rivals from attempting to undermine the
integrity of U.S. elections, especially through cyber-enabled means.
Just how well deterrence is operating in any given situation is noto-
riously different to prove (is the target not acting because she is
deterred, or because she is simply unable?), but attempts should be
made regardless.
The principal method of deterrence is known as deterrence by
cost imposition. By threatening to impose unacceptable cost on a
rival if the rival engages in a certain action, the hope is that the rival
correctly understands that those costs outweigh expected gains.
The challenge for the United States as it considers how to deter
meddling in its election systems is to make a threat that is credible
but not excessively escalatory.
One method of cost imposition the United States has previously
employed against foreign hackers is to expose them. While a “nam-
ing and shaming” approach may at first blush seem unsatisfying as a
response action, exposure not just of the names of the hackers but
of methods of hacking can force remaining hackers to abandon the
now-compromised infrastructure and allows defenders to block the
now-compromised techniques of intrusion. To be effective, how-
ever, the United States would need to remain vigilant to guard
199. Lisa O. Monaco, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterter-
rorism, Keynote Address at the Center for Strategic & International Studies: The National
Security Division at 10: Past, Present, and Future (Sept. 14, 2016), file:///Users/dleib/
Downloads/160914_Monaco_Keynote.pdf.
200. For more information on the ‘Race to the Top’ program, see Race to the Top Fund,
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUCATION, http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/index.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 21, 2017).
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against the potential of the exposed hackers continuing their at-
tacks using different infrastructure. As of this writing, the United
States has attributed the hacking of the DNC to Russia, but has offi-
cially said little more.201
Another method to impose cost, which can be undertaken in ad-
dition to exposure, is to indict the offending hackers. The United
States pursued indictments on five Chinese hackers from the Peo-
ple’s Liberation Army and on several hackers with various
affiliations to Iran.202 While these foreign hackers are beyond the
immediate reach of U.S. law enforcement, indicting them adds a
heightened level of probably unwanted exposure to these hackers.
It also hinders geographic freedom of movement, as hackers would
not want to arrange future travel in ways that would make them
susceptible to coming within the grasp of the long arm of U.S. laws.
An additional method of cost imposition is for the United States
to threaten to impose sanctions on offending entities, organiza-
tions, or individuals. There are two avenues of authority under
which such sanctions might be ordered. First, President Obama’s
April 1, 2015, executive order enables the blocking of property of
those the United States determines are committing certain signifi-
cant malicious cyber activities.203 This “direct” sanction authority is
tailored to those who, among other things, harm a computer that is
part of, or compromises the provision of services within, a critical
infrastructure sector. To sanction those who would attempt to com-
promise the U.S. election system under this authority, it would
seem that designating the electoral system as CI is a necessary first
step. As of this writing, the federal government has not sanctioned
any entities under this authority.
A second avenue through which the United States could impose
sanctions as a method of cost imposition is by other, “indirect” au-
thority. Here, the federal government could sanction entities for
201. See, e.g., Katie Bo Williams, Obama Administration Publicly Blames Russia for DNC Hack,
THE HILL (Oct. 7, 2016, 3:41 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/299874-obama-
administration-publicly-blames-russia-for-dnc-hack.
202. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers
for Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial
Advantage, (May 19, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-
hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor; Ellen Nakashima & Matt
Zapotosky, U.S. Charges Iran-Linked Hackers with Targeting Banks, N.Y. Dam, WASH. POST (Mar.
24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-department-to-
unseal-indictment-against-hackers-linked-to-iranian-goverment/2016/03/24/9b3797d2-f17b-
11e5-a61f-e9c95c06edca_story.html?utm_term=.e99afdd2c6b4.
203. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Executive Order—“Blocking the Prop-
erty of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities” (Apr. 1,
2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/01/executive-order-blocking-
property-certain-persons-engaging-significant-m.
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their hacking activities not directly, but on account of their govern-
ment affiliations or other non-cyber-related offenses. For example,
in the aftermath of North Korea’s cyber attack against Sony Pic-
tures, President Obama signed an Executive Order that authorized
sanctions against almost any North Korean government official, re-
gardless of the hand they may have had in the cyber attack against
Sony.204 The value of these indirect sanctions as a method of cost
imposition is compelling because now the political masters of per-
petrators of cyber attacks—not just the hackers themselves—are
more at risk of having their assets frozen or their travel banned.
Another method by which the United States could threaten to
impose cost to deter cyber attacks is to threaten to counterattack. At
one extreme, a Defense Science Board report encouraged policy-
makers to consider the threat of employing nuclear weapons as an
option to deter large-scale, catastrophic cyber attacks.205 Non-
nuclear kinetic strikes are also an available method to impose cost,
though the cyber attack that triggers such a response would likely
need to cause significant physical damage and disruption. The
United States could also employ a non-kinetic military response op-
tion, such as a proportional offensive cyber operation.
Using military force in any of these scenarios is a significant step
and should never be undertaken lightly. But as cyber attacks
threaten different aspects of U.S. democratic society and security, it
becomes more plausible to consider such options in order to deter
would-be attackers.206
CONCLUSION
When we flip a switch, we expect the lights to come on. When we
pull a lever, or touch a screen, we expect our vote to be recorded
accurately. And when we debate about the next U.S. president, we
expect that dialogue to be free of foreign entanglements. A first
204. See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Executive Order—Imposing Addi-
tional Sanctions with Respect to North Korea (Jan. 2, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2015/01/02/executive-order-imposing-additional-sanctions-respect-north-
korea.
205. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEF. SCI. BOARD, RESILIENT MILITARY SYSTEMS AND THE AD-
VANCED CYBER THREAT 1 (2013), http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ResilientMilitarySys
tems.CyberThreat.pdf.
206. It may also be desirable to begin a conversation about prioritizing risks to U.S. CI
such that movie theatres are no longer on bar with the electric grid in terms of DHS poli-
cymaking.  Other nations, including China, already have such a policy in place. See Scott J.
Shackelford & Amanda N. Craig, Beyond the New ‘Digital Divide’: Analyzing the Evolving Role of
Governments in Internet Governance and Enhancing Cybersecurity, 50 STAN. J. OF INT’L L. 119,
158–63 (2014).
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step in realizing these goals—and ensuring that the 2016 DNC
hack, or worse, is not repeated in 2020 or 2024—is recognizing our
democratic machinery as being at least as important as our indus-
trial machinery. This Article therefore recommends that the Trump
administration keep the Obama administration’s classification of
the U.S. voting system—in particular the IT backbone of election
administration that includes voting machines and tabulation mech-
anisms—as critical infrastructure, and that this classification be the
beginning of the process to secure U.S. elections, not the end.
